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The Singapore ‘Advantage’ in Suzhou, China: Premium of Perception? 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This paper revisits Singapore’s industrial development in Suzhou, China, which has been in 
operation for more than a decade. We aim to glean insights from this experiment and more 
importantly, to verify recent claims of it generating political gain and economic capital for 
Singapore. The flagship project took on an identical framework as the other Singaporean 
transborder industrialization ventures in the region by adopting Singapore’s expertise and 
reputation for an efficient and stable government and investment environment. These measures 
were coupled with the combination of local-specific advantages in the region, such as availability 
of cheaper labour and market access. Singapore’s regionalization stratagem is placed under 
scrutiny in this paper; the ensuing competitive interactions between competitor parks and 
Singaporean-styled parks have raised questions on the economics of competition and sustaining 
competitive advantage. This calls into question the value of Singapore’s, value-added services 
and infrastructure. 
 
 
Key Words: Trans-border Industrialization; China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Through selective state intervention, Singapore attempts to reallocate central resources via 
the formation of government partnerships and joint ventures with private as well as semi-private 
enterprises. This policy of economic reorganization and development highlights the considerable 
political will and ability of the state to mobilize and deploy resources to achieve national goals 
(Yeung and Olds, 1998). These endeavors into overseas industrial townships were the main 
thrust of Singapore’s regionalization attempts and are crucial aspects of Singapore’s economic 
restructuring (Singapore Ministry of Finance 1993). 
 
SINGAPORE’S REGIONALIZATION STRATEGIES 
The scarcity of resources in Singapore has compelled the island city-state to constantly 
pursue varying means to remain competitive in the dynamic global economy (Huff, 1995). Since 
independence, the Singapore government has sought to attract foreign direct investment, 
technology, management expertise and talent through selective intervention (Pereira, 2000). The 
state also played a crucial role in developing inter-regional and international economic 
cooperation (Yeoh et al, 2004). The fuelling of economic progress by extending its economic 
hinterland beyond its geographic borders is the mainframe of Singapore’s regionalization 
strategy. The following paragraphs trace the development of this state-led initiative.  
In the early post-independence years, Singapore’s export-led industrialization was heavily 
dependent on investor-friendly environments and low labour costs to attract investments (Peebles 
and Wilson, 1996). The 1985 recession emphasized the need for Singapore to restructure its 
economic policies (MTI, 1986); this period impregnated the vision of expanding Singapore’s 
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economic horizons beyond its geographical constraints2. This initiative sought to hasten the 
embrace of new technology and access to overseas markets, by supporting Singapore companies 
to form joint ventures with overseas companies in Europe and North America. However, most of 
these ventures were unsuccessful, being chiefly hampered by the inability of Singapore firms to 
secure a foothold in these industrialized economies. 
The internationalization strategy was modified in 1993 from ‘outer globalization’ to ‘inner 
globalization’, refocusing on the emerging regional economies such as China, Vietnam, 
Indonesia and India (Regnier, 1993; Mahizhnan, 1994; Okposin, 1999). The shift from 
internationalization to regionalization was rationalized by the high growth rates achieved by 
these economies (Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB 1993, 1995b), which 
Singapore sought to capitalize on. The dearth of opportunities for small scale services (such as 
transport and construction firms) in Singapore, combined with the market possibilities for these 
services in overseas infrastructural projects, offered another aspect of appeal for industrial 
township development (Tan, 1995). The strategic intent was to facilitate Singapore’s transition to 
a ‘total business centre’ by relocating low value-adding manufacturing activities to regional sites, 
and restructuring the Singapore economy into a regional hub for the higher-end activities of 
Singapore-based MNCs (Yeung, 1999), and promising local enterprises, or in local parlance, 
PLEs. The ration d’etre for the regionalization stratagem was succinctly expressed in the policy 
document, Singapore Unlimited (SEDB, 1995a, p.9): 
“Singapore’s regionalization thrust will help it create economic space beyond the island. It will enable 
Singapore to ‘borrow’ the region’s resources and markets. In return, the region will also be able to 
borrow Singapore’s strengths as a global city with international linkages.”  
                                                 
2
 This vision is encapsulated in the policy document, ‘Gearing Up for an Enhanced Role in the Global Economy’ 
(Singapore Economic Development Board (SEDB), 1988). 
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With Singapore’s first regional industrial township development, the Batamindo Industrial 
Park (BIP) in Batam Indonesia, enjoying considerable early successes, the regionalization 
initiative emphasized replication of Singapore’s reputed systemic efficiencies and industrial 
competencies through the establishment of Singaporean-styled industrial parks in the region 
(Perry and Yeoh, 2000). By creating these townships, the state was creating familiar 
environments and stable investment havens for Singapore-based firms, both foreign and 
indigenous, to operate in. As well, the township projects were positioned to address the 
reluctance of Singaporean businesses to venture abroad, by providing Singaporeans abroad, 
access to Singaporean-styled services.  Furthermore, in these regional networks, co-operating 
with the host governments provides the groundwork for greater economic collaboration (Pereira, 
2003; Peng and Zhou, 2005).  
As well, by banking on its reputable infrastructure and management, Singapore promoted 
these industrial enclaves as packages with location-specific strengths (such as low labour costs 
and strategic markets). In this aspect, the Singaporean government played three key roles: first, 
negotiating the institutional framework for the development of industrial parks; second, 
conducting ministerial delegations’ visits to raise the profiles of the parks and give greater 
emphasis on interpersonal ties (or guanxi) (Redding, 1990; Brown, 1998); third, government-
linked companies taking the lead in infrastructural development (Zutshi and Gibbons, 1998) and 
government agencies such as the Singapore Economic Development Board (Schein, 1996) 
playing vital roles in the intense promotion of the industrial parks to investors. CS-SIP is 
amongst the townships which are developed on such a fusion of location-specific factors, 
governmental intervention, and transplant of reputation, infrastructure and management systems. 
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To provide the context to this paper, the theoretical considerations underpinning this flagship 
project are sketched in the next section followed by an account of the origins and progress of the 
case-study park. The analysis is reinforced by empirical data from our on-site surveys of the 
parks’ tenants, and in-depth case studies of selected tenants in both locations.  The final section 
considers the implications of the SIP experience on the ‘exportability’ of the Singapore industrial 
development model, and on a broader note, on the future of Singapore’s transborder 
industrialization strategies. 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 Dunning’s (1980, 1995, 2001) eclectic paradigm sought to provide the analytical basis for 
explaining the activities of firms situated beyond their national boundaries. The OLI paradigm was 
used to explain the ability and willingness of firms to serve markets, and examine the reasons for 
their choice of exploiting this advantage through foreign production rather than domestic 
production, exports or portfolio resource flows through the interaction of Ownership-specific (O) 
advantages, Location-specific (L) advantages, and Internalization-incentive (I) advantages. The 
paradigm was reconfigured to constitute the ‘asset-augmenting’ aspects of FDI and MNC activity. 
For instance, O-advantages have been separated into static and dynamic - static advantages 
describing the advantages possessed by a firm that generate income at a particular point of time 
and dynamic advantages illustrating the proprietary factors which permit a firm to boost its 
incoming-generating assets over time. 
In similar vein, Porter (1994), Dunning (1998) and others (surveyed in Jovanovic 2003), have 
reiterated the importance of the spatial dimension, such as location-advantages as affecting the 
competitiveness of investing firms. The strategic choice of firms’ locations reflects twin aims - to 
 6 
not only transfer their resources to the host countries, but also to gain access to the available 
strategic assets (Makino and Delios 1996) and markets (Davies and Weinstein, 2003). Like O-
advantages, L-advantages can also be classified as static and dynamic. While an industrial 
township facilitates companies’ resource-dependent operations with its static L-advantages, the 
geographical concentration of such activity also engenders dynamic L-advantages such as asset-
augmenting activities (e.g. R&D) and agglomeration benefits (Krugman, 1991; Porter, 1996). 
Given their deeply entrenched sources, these dynamic L-advantages cannot be easily replicated 
elsewhere.  Markusen (1996) also points out that although firms may relocate knowledge and 
similar assets, assets with a public good or collective characteristic cannot be easily moved. And, 
as firms’ core competencies become increasingly knowledge-intensive, the location in which firms 
locate their production, organization and use of assets emerges as a critical competitive advantage 
(Porter, 2000).  
As well, the roles of governments in advancing the competitiveness of a country or region 
within a country need to be altered accordingly, as created assets supersede natural factor 
endowments as a key determinant of location (Dunning and Narula, 1996). Stopford (1999) and 
others similarly argue that governments need to ensure that the availability, quality and cost-
effectiveness of general purpose inputs have to match up to the standards of their global 
competitors, as well as to create and sustain an institutional framework and ethos.  This is to 
facilitate a continuous upgrading of the resources and capabilities within its jurisdiction and 
facilitate, rather than impede micro-regional clusters development and upgrading. 
 CS-SIP represents a collaborative effort by the Singapore and Chinese governments in creating 
location-bound advantages through a propitious combination of cost-effective factors of 
production, efficient infrastructure and management expertise; i.e., supplementing natural location-
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specific advantages with engineered ones crafted to attract foreign direct investments to the park.  
This paper assesses whether such a strategic alignment of competitive and comparative advantage 
has been created in the CS-SIP project. 
 
CHINA-SINGAPORE SUZHOU INDUSTRIAL PARK (CS-SIP) 
Launched on May 12, 1994, CS-SIP was Singapore’s most ambitious and controversial 
overseas township project. The project cost was reportedly estimated at US$20 billion.  The 
‘Singapore model’, as applied to CS-SIP, envisaged a large-scale project to facilitate institutional 
innovation, autonomy from aspects of local government control and investment in administrative 
practice or ‘software development’ (SIPAC, 1999).  This project encompassed high quality 
infrastructure, pollution control, ‘one-stop’,  transparent operating and decision-making 
processes, minimum entry or performance regulations, and the delivery of social and welfare 
services to support an efficient, work-oriented environment. As well, the model not only 
encompasses strategies for attracting and establishing local bases for foreign companies.  This 
project is a litmus test of the exportability of the ‘Singapore development model’ to countries in 
the region.   
The project was developed by a joint venture between a consortium of Chinese and 
Singapore-based investors known as the CS-SIP Development Company (CSSD). CSSD is 
overseen by a local authority, the Suzhou Industrial Park Administrative Committee (SIPAC). 
The Chinese consortia’s initial 35% stake was shared amongst 12 organizations, mainly state-
owned enterprises and investment companies of Jiangsu province. The Singapore consortia’s 
initial 65% was distributed amongst 24 organizations, mainly Singapore government-linked 
companies, and the Salim Group (through a subsidiary, KMP China Investments). The two 
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consortia retained separate identities and responsibilities, taking up projects according to the 
agreed roles. 
CS-SIP was touted as a locale which offers abundant labour, and other local resources, at 
competitive costs, and in proximity to target markets. The primary factors are purportedly 
enhanced and strengthened by world-class infrastructure within the park, strong commitment and 
support from the local authorities, and growing bilateral economic co-operation between 
Singapore and China. The envisaged product of this combination is an industrial park, distinct 
amidst the competition, which presents itself as attractive investment enclaves 
However, barely five years into the flagship project, Singapore acknowledged that the 
original vision of transferring its industrial development model to Suzhou was a much more 
complex and challenging process than previously envisaged. The synergy that was envisioned at 
the onset did not materialize. Singapore’s disappointment was pointedly highlighted by then 
Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s public questioning of the commitment of the Chinese partners 
to the project. By 1999, the township had attracted only 5,000 residents against a target of 
600,000. The park was employing 14,000 workers, while the original projection was 360,000. 
The slow progress resulted in financial losses for the Singapore-led consortium which funded the 
land development and infrastructure, and also for investors involved in peripheral projects. 
These, and other protracted difficulties, led to the announcement in 1999 that Singapore 
would transfer majority ownership to the Chinese partners in 2001, with the latter taking a 65% 
stake in the new alignment of interests. Interestingly, CS-SIP’s performance turned around 
within a year following the transfer of majority ownership and management control. By the end 
of 2005, CS-SIP had secured cumulative contractual foreign investments exceeding US$19 
billion, and established a tenant profile of over 1,750 foreign investment enterprises, including 
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52 Fortune 500 MNCs, and over 7,000 domestic companies. Its tenants includes, significantly, a 
large proportion of American, European and Japanese investors, with over 70% of their 
investments in electronics, information technology and other high-tech segments. 
Taking the momentum forward, CSSD has announced several new development goals for the 
park: contractual investments to exceed US$20 billion and utilized investments to surpass 
US$10billion. The second and third phase of the transportation network and other infrastructure 
projects, to be developed at an estimated cost of US$10billion, is in progress. CSSD plans to list 
in China, and possibly, in Singapore. 
 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
 For a more comprehensive analysis of CS-SIP, and to better ascertain the situation on the 
ground, it is inadequate to rely on secondary data from official publications and press reports. 
The success of the park hinges in large measure on its ability to harness the micro-economic 
processes of specific firms and industries in a global environment. In particular, the alliance 
between Singapore and China should ideally provide a suitable framework within which firms 
can pursue and develop strategies which support their global business operations and 
competitiveness. The premium that underscores the development and management of the Park is 
that each of the alliance-partners offers different, yet complementary, advantages to firms.  As 
such, the attractiveness and competitiveness of CS-SIP is the extent to which the firms’ 
manufacturing operations are synergistically linked to the advantages proffered by the Park. 
 To obtain such primary data, we applied the survey questionnaire developed in Yeoh, et al. 
(2000) through direct interviews with CS-SIP tenants. Our survey questionnaire was designed to 
gauge the differential impact of various push/pull factors on the tenants’ decision to locate in the 
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case-study parks, along with the differential impact of different types of constraints on their 
operations. The on-site interviews were carried out in CS-SIP in August 2004 and April 2005.   
 Profile of Respondents 
Of the 78 respondents in CS-SIP, 10 were wholly Singaporean-owned, 31 were wholly 
Chinese-owned, 31 were wholly foreign-owned, and 6 were joint ventures. With respect to 
nature of operations, 4 manufactured consumer products, 18 manufactured intermediate 
products, 8 manufactured capital products, 5 provided industrial services and 42 engaged in other 
types of operations such as industrial and support services. In terms of employment size, 67 
respondents had less than 100 employees, 8 employed between 101 to 500 employees, while 2 
employed between 501 and 1,000 employees. In terms of target markets, 59 firms targeted the 
domestic China market as one of their top three markets, 14 targeted the OECD economies, 17 
targeted the East Asian markets, excluding Japan and ASEAN economies. 
Statistical Treatment of Survey Results 
Apart from analyzing the descriptive statistics and popular rankings on the responses relating 
to factors and constraints, a logit model3 was applied to compare the perceived advantages 
                                                 
3
 The logit model involves a binary choice of the ith firm which can be represented by a random variable, Zi, which takes the value of 1 if a 
certain choice is made and the value 0 if that choice is not made. The (cumulative) logistic distribution function, estimated by the maximum 
likelihood, takes the following form: 
Pi = exp(Zi) / [ 1 + exp(Zi)] 
where: Pi is the probability of firm i choosing the factor in question; exp refers to the exponentiation operator and  
Zi is a linear function of the firm attributes, defined as   
Zi = α0 + α1F1 + α2F2 + α3F3+ α4F4 + α4F4 + α4F4  
where: F1 = 1 if ‘wholly China-owned’ is selected, 0 otherwise; F2 = 1 if ‘wholly Singapore-owned’ is selected, 0 otherwise; F3 = 1 if 
‘manufacturing intermediate products’ is selected, 0 otherwise; F4 = 1 if ‘providing industrial services’ is selected, 0 otherwise; F5 = 1 
if ‘targets Other Asian market’ is selected, 0 otherwise; F6 = 1 if ‘targets non-Asian markets’ is selected, 0 otherwise; α0 = constant 
term; αi = coefficient of independent (explanatory) variable 
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influencing the tenants’ decision to locate in the case-study parks. A similar model was also 
applied to the constraints faced by the tenants in these parks as well as the firms’ responses to 
these constraints. The logit estimations are set out in Tables 1, 2 and 3 respectively.  
Factors influencing respondents’ decision to invest in the case-study parks4  (Table 1) 
The key factors in CS-SIP that attracts investors can be categorized into 3 categories: 
favourable political and investment climate; the availability of physical and human resources, 
related and supporting industries; and strategic location. 
The logit estimations, presented in Table 1 assert that Chinese tenants are less likely to 
consider competitive labour as a major pull factor in comparison to foreign companies. This is 
indicated by the respective negative and statistically significant α1 (= -1.631). In the eyes of 
many overseas businessmen, the Chinese mainland is a paradise for investment, due to its huge 
market potential and low labour costs. From Porter, the local-specific factor (in this instance, 
competitive labour costs) may be deemed as a ‘given’ advantage for the local Chinese firms. 
‘Access to overseas markets’ is not a significant consideration for Chinese firms as indicated 
by the negative and significant α1 (=-1.562). Most Chinese firms are not export oriented vis-à-vis 
their foreign counterparts and hence access to overseas markets features as of lower importance.   
Chinese firms are also inclined towards favoring the availability of skilled labour, as indicated by 
the positive and statistically significant α1 (=1.093). Despite competitive labour costs, Chinese 
firms face a dearth of adequately trained labour. Compared to Singaporean firms, this is a more 
significant predicament as the latter are able to post experienced personnel from Singapore with 
                                                                                                                                                             
Hence, if the estimated coefficients in the logit model is statistically significant (as indicated by the z- statistics and p-values, this would imply 
that the probability of a firm (e.g. foreign-owned) choosing a particular factor is greater than the probability of another firm (of different 
ownership type) making the choice, after taking into consideration the types of goods and services produced. 
4
 ‘Respondents’ decisions to invest’ refer to past investment decisions, made at the time the Park was built and/or marketed to the tenants, so as 
to reveal the effectiveness of Singapore’s initial efforts at building a ‘second wing’. 
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relative ease; illustrating a possible competitive advantage Singaporean tenants may have vis-à-
vis their Chinese counterparts. 
On the other hand, Singaporean firms tend not to consider the political commitment from 
China as a major pull factor, as substantiated by the negative and statistically significant α2 (=-
2.235).  Although this is surprising given that local legislations and reforms undeniably have a 
heavy impact on the firms operations, it however suggests that the established Singaporean-
owned businesses in the park do have the necessary connections or “guanxi”.  On a side note, 
such familiarity of the local business climate by the Singaporean firms suggests some degree of 
success for the Singapore government in finding a suitable environment for local firms to expand 
into the region.  
Firms providing industrial services tend to disregard the political commitment from China as 
a major pull factor, as depicted by the negative and statistically significant α4 (=-3.360). These 
firms tend to have a smaller capital outlay and are not over-dependent on political commitment 
from the host country for its long term development. However, firms that target Asian markets, 
excluding China and Japan, place emphasis on this factor. This is explained by the positive and 
significant α7 (=2.631).  
As for the nature of operations, firms manufacturing intermediate products consider 
investment incentives and conducive industrial relations as pull factors, as suggested by the 
respective positive and statistically significant α3 (=1.165 and 1.214 respectively). 
Manufacturing intermediate products would incur a relatively large capital outlay and running 
costs, and investment incentives such as tax exemptions on exported goods offered in CS-SIP 
offsets this sizeable outlays.  
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 Firms that target OECD economics are attracted to CS-SIP largely because of its provision of 
a one-stop service. The success of CS-SIP was initially hinged on its being the first Singapore-
styled park in China to introduce pro-business services such as the one-stop service centre, and 
this has indeed drawn in firms whose target markets are not even in proximity to China. The 
firms targeting OECD markets are often focused on building complementary relationships 
between local-specific and competitive strengths, and relying on efficiency in operations from 
the pro-business services available at CS-SIP. Expectedly, these export-oriented firms disregard 
the presence of major buyers in the vicinity of CS-SIP and access to the Chinese domestic 
market as pull factors, as indicated by the negative and statistically significant α8 (=-1.118 and -
0.985). 
 Constraints faced by Respondents’ Operations (Table 2) 
 Despite being an established industrial park with 10 years of experience, tenants in CS-SIP 
face emerging constraints, which have undermined its attractiveness. These constraints, for 
purposes of analysis, are categorized into four broad segments, namely: labour-related, 
organizational-related, economic-related and environmental-related constraints. 
 The logit estimation, as presented in Table 2, demonstrates that the shortage of semi-skilled 
and skilled labour is a major constraint faced by Singaporean firms as indicated by the positive 
and significant β 2 (=2.296). Many Singaporean firms engage in higher technologically reliant 
production vis-à-vis the Chinese firms; therefore, a more adequately trained workforce is 
required. As well, Chinese firms tend not to be constrained by the shortage of professionals and 
managers, as indicated by the negative and significant β 1 (=-1.209). This further supports the 
analysis above. 
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 Despite the oft-perceived difficulty in sourcing for raw materials, logit estimations reveal 
that this is not a concern for Chinese companies as indicated by the negative and highly 
statistically significant β 1 (=-2.295). Familiarity with the Chinese market, especially in the Jiang-
Nan region, allows Chinese firms to obtain raw materials at competitive prices with relative ease, 
as compared to foreign firms.   
 Singaporean-owned firms tend to regard the impact of government regulations as a major 
constraint, as shown by the positive and statistically significant β 2 (=1.692). It is of no surprise 
that Singaporean-owned companies are more concerned with this constraint, which may impact 
the firms’ efficiency and operational costs. As elaborated earlier, they are cautious of operating 
in an overseas locale and react more markedly vis-à-vis local firms to changes in government 
regulation. 
 Singaporean-owned companies also reflected that they were being constrained by 
protectionist barriers which restrict market access to developing countries as indicated by the 
positive and significant β 2 (=2.293). Despite possessing a world-class export processing zone 
and favorable export incentives, CS-SIP’s efforts are undermined by developing countries 
introducing protectionist barriers. This is due to worries that China’s low-priced exports may 
undercut the developing countries’ own output. Chinese firms are less affected by these barriers 
as they primarily target the domestic market.  
As expected, the lack of familiarity with local business practices is not a constraint for 
Chinese firms, as indicated by the negative and significant β 1 (=-1.427).  Nevertheless, 
Singaporean firms tend to be constrained by the lack of transparency or frequent changes in host 
regulations, as reflected by a positive and significant β 2 (=2.142). Singaporean firms are more 
comfortable with Singapore styled regulations which are transparent and stable regulations, 
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having been attracted to CS-SIP because of its Singaporean-model. However, this has not been 
fully realized, partly due to the illusory clout and influence which the Singapore consortium had 
over the issue of regulations and transparency in the park.  
Firms’ Response to Constraints (Table 3) 
In face of these constraints, firms have adopted various responses to resolve them. 
Singaporean-owned firms are especially likely to source for experienced executives from 
Singapore when faced with a lack of skilled and professional labour. This is as indicated by the 
positive and significant λ2 (=2.500) – being reflective of the combination of location-specific 
advantages of availability of cheap local labour in the host country, and competitive advantages, 
such as the availability of experienced executives in the home country. 
Firms also encourage training and promote workers’ productivity through various support 
schemes, as reflected in the first and second rankings respectively, in the absolute ranking of 
response frequencies. Another noteworthy aspect is that firms have not displayed an interest in 
approaching Singaporean agencies or authorities for assistance. This is also the case for 
Singaporean firms, despite the ‘safety net’ provided for them by the vested interests of both the 
Singaporean and Chinese governments in the township project. 
 
CASE STUDIES 
To reinforce our logits estimations, we included 3 in-depth case studies from CS-SIP.  To 
provide a more holistic analysis to the paper, 2 examples Suzhou New District (SND) are also 
highlighted.  SND is perceived as a competitor to CS-SIP and a brief description of the enclave is 
provided.  The case study firms’ characteristics are summarized in Table 4. 
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Case Studies from the China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park 
Case SIP-1 – Electronic Components.  Company SIP-1 is a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
United Kingdom corporation, which is one of the world’s largest producers of electrical and 
electronic cable assemblies. The parent company owns 27 manufacturing facilities in 15 
countries, employing over 12,000 workers. The parent company’s regional headquarters for Asia 
is located in Singapore. 
The firm located its operations in CS-SIP mainly for investment incentives, the availability of 
manpower resources and competitive labour costs. On the issue of political climate, the company 
believes that its primary concern is the political commitment from China, rather than that from 
Singapore, primarily because the Chinese government has a veto over legislations that affect the 
operation of firms in CS-SIP. Also reflected in the logit analysis, this perception (which prevails 
not just in Singaporean firms, but also in foreign firms) highlights the importance of having 
steadfast support from the local authorities for the success of the industrial township.  
Albeit common opinion of lack of transparency in Chinese government regulations, 
Company SIP-1 believes that the issue of transparency is considerably well-handled in Suzhou 
compared to the other Chinese regions. Noteworthy, the company has periodic interactions with 
the CS-SIP authorities, during which the company may raise concerns with regards to operation 
constraints. Similar to the logit analyses for Singaporean firms, the foreign company will 
approach the Park or Chinese authorities rather than Singaporean agencies regarding issues 
pertaining to operations in CS-SIP. 
However, because the primary function of this Suzhou-registered company is in 
manufacturing, the shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour in CS-SIP has placed a bottleneck 
on its development. To tackle this issue, the company posts experienced executives from its 
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Singapore regional headquarters to assist in managing the CS-SIP subsidiary. Since only a basic 
skill set is required to handle the company operations, it trains workers locally, instead of 
sending them abroad for training. This echoes the logit analysis which reveals shortage of skilled 
and semi-skilled labour as being a major labour-related constraint faced by foreign (Singapore) 
firms. 
Furthermore, CS-SIP’s apparent advantage in competitive labour costs (which has been 
attributed as attracting the company’s establishment in the Park), is also now being questioned. 
The lack of suitable labour has driven up costs and has affected the company’s evaluation of the 
labour aspects of CS-SIP adversely. According to its Human Resource Department, government 
policies, such as wage and manpower policies, are helpful in resolving the labour issue. 
Nevertheless, the market will eventually determine the factors that influence labour dynamics. 
In the near future, the company plans to expand its operations within CS-SIP. Due to space 
constraints within the current area of development, the expansion will not be within the industrial 
park. This may be influenced by the increased willingness of expanding firms in branching out to 
new areas that are currently under development in CS-SIP. 
Case SIP-2 – Packaging.  Company SIP-2 is an American owned firm, and its parent 
company (with a workforce of 12,000), is involved in production of diverse products such as 
bag-in-box packaging, metalized plastics and paper. In CS-SIP, the company produces bags for 
wine, dairy products and foodstuff for use in Asia. As this company was established only 
recently, it currently employs fewer than 100 employees. However, they have plans to expand 
their operation capacity and employment scale within the Park.  
The company expressed that the two key reasons for locating in CS-SIP were the political 
climate and the infrastructural facilities and support services. According to them, CS-SIP is one 
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of the most reputable of the Chinese parks, hence highlighting the relevance of reputation of CS-
SIP in its competition with neighboring industrial parks. The company did consider locating in 
another park in Wuxi, but considered the infrastructural support in CS-SIP as being better in 
comparison. On the topic of political climate, the company believes that the political 
commitment from both China and Singapore are crucial; the transfer of the strength in 
Singapore’s software being crucial for the success of CS-SIP. On the issue of infrastructural 
facilities, the company expressed concerns that although the infrastructure at CS-SIP was in 
place, there might be delays in maintenance and operation of infrastructural support. This 
concern reflects the deterioration of the infrastructural advantage of CS-SIP. 
 For Company SIP-2, their key operating constraint is the availability of requisite labour in 
the Park. There is a palpable shortage of skilled and semi-skilled labour. Furthermore, the 
company mentions that the training of the workers is hampered by a comparatively unsuitable 
labour pool available. In attempts to resolve the issue, the company sends foreign staff to China; 
and local staff for training purposes. This is similar to the response to labour constraints made by 
Singaporean firms, which send executives to manage the firms’ establishments in China. In these 
cases, the unique play upon competitive and local-specific advantages is evident. 
On the issue of labour, the company expressed another concern for the worker’s welfare – the 
CS-SIP Provident Fund (SPF). Despite the good intentions of the SPF system, some workers 
desire to have a higher take-home salary.  The company hence expressed concerns over the wage 
policy in CS-SIP. This view highlights a possible area of neglect in the management policies of 
CS-SIP. 
Case SIP-3 – Molding.  Company SIP-3 is involved in molding and is a subsidiary of a 
Japanese parent company, which is a leader in high performance composite alloys. As the 
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company was incorporated recently, their number of employees in CS-SIP is fewer than 50.  The 
primary factor attracting Company SIP-3 in setting up in CS-SIP is the preferential access to the 
domestic market; noting that their parent company has established a subsidiary in Henan, China. 
However, the company is now shifting its market focus from China to the ASEAN region. This 
reflects the importance of CS-SIP as an initial gateway to the Chinese market, with firms 
possibly altering their strategic focus to regional markets thereafter. 
Due to the nature of its operations, the company was initially not concerned with the 
availability of raw materials in CS-SIP because the raw materials are imported from Japan. This 
concern arose only recently as the Company shifted its procurement of raw materials from Japan 
to China. This may be a similar scenario for companies which shift their raw material sources 
upon settling in the Chinese environment. 
The highly mechanized operating environment of the company is constrained by a difficulty 
in introducing new technology to its processes. The firm cites issues concerning the maintenance 
of equipment and training of its workforce locally. To resolve these problems, the company has 
posted experienced executives from Japan, and encourages training amongst Chinese employees. 
The responses of other firms in CS-SIP are seemingly similar and pragmatic.  Holistically, the 
company evaluates the CS-SIP favorably, making special mention of the handling of logistics, 
where it has experienced little difficulty in transportation and procurement. Another important 
strength that has persisted in CS-SIP is the reputable infrastructure and town-planning; this 
contributes to the controversial debate about the whether CS-SIP infrastructure is losing its 
appeal to investors. 
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Case Studies from Suzhou New & Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone (SND) 
After its construction was approved by the State Council of China in 1992, SND became one 
of the first four APEC hi-tech development zones in China in 1997. In 1999, SND also became 
the first ISO14000-certified industrial estate in China. Spanning an area of 258 sq-km, the 
project was affiliated to the Suzhou municipal government. As well, SND aims to create a 
diversified township of modern industry, commerce and housing, thus arguably posing the 
greatest direct competition to CS-SIP. Furthermore, SND offers several benefits modeled after 
CS-SIP, including the offering a form of the ‘one-stop service’. Possessing advantages in lower 
labour and rental costs, SND had managed to attract a total accumulated foreign capital of 
US$11.7 billion by end 2004. 1,050 foreign companies are registered in SND, including 40 
Fortune 500 companies.  
At present, SND has upped the ante in its challenge to CS-SIP with the completion of its 
latest phase5 of development as well as the development of the Suzhou Technological Complex, 
International Education Park, Lakeside New City and several other industrial estates. However, 
the unstable provision of power and utilities is still of a major concern to SND tenants.  
Case SND-1.  Company SND-1 is a Swiss-owned subsidiary that manufactures electronic 
components. The parent company is a leader in the production of computer accessories. With 
sales of more than US$30 million, Company SND-1 has considerable presence in SND. 80% of 
the products manufactured are exported to overseas markets, particularly in OECD countries. 
The settling of the firm in SND is part of the company’s strategy to leverage on the 
availability of manpower resources in China and to gain preferential access to its target markets. 
To the company, SND’s industrial relations are an important factor for their locating in the 
                                                 
5
 The initial Phase of SND is subdivided into a Central Business District, sub central residential areas, science research and development area, 
modern hi-tech industrial area and a logistic area. 
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industrial estate. SND’s infrastructure facilities and support services play the role of another 
crucial determinant. Similar to the reactions of CS-SIP firms, Company SND-1, despite 
perceiving the availability of skilled labour being an initial pull-factor, now considers the lack of 
skilled or semi-skilled labour as a constraint on its operations and development. 
Another important constraint highlighted is the impact of government regulations pertaining 
to the complexity of export procedures. However, the company perceives the export procedures, 
though complex, as relatively better than elsewhere in China. This is a similar view echoed by 
firms in CS-SIP.  In the area of organization and technology, Company SND-1 faces difficulties 
in the procurement of capital equipment and in introducing new technology and techniques.  To 
adapt to these constraints, the company has imported technology from its Swiss headquarters into 
SND and carries out training programs for the local staff. 
Holistically, the Company regards the utilities, labour and amenities in SND favorably. With 
regard to the logistics facilities and services in SND, Company SND-1 feels that the processes 
are complicated, are likewise, comparably better than in elsewhere. This reflects the extent to 
which SND has caught up with CS-SIP in terms of logistics and infrastructure. 
Case SND-2.  Company SND-2 is a subsidiary of a Korean company. An automobile 
component manufacturer, the company caters for the domestic market, its key market in the 
Jiangsu Province.  It perceives the political climate as being more developed in Suzhou, than in 
Shenzhen, and hence invested in SND. The presence of its major suppliers in Suzhou also 
influenced the Company’s decision to settle in Suzhou. The availability of manpower resources 
is viewed by the Korean company as an important strength of SND, and as an added bonus, some 
of the labour force have a basic grasp of the English and Korean language. This highlights one 
aspect that has been much overlooked in the academic research regarding overseas industrial 
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parks – the aspect of the language barrier and communication differences between parent and 
subsidiary companies. 
The key constraint faced by the firm is that of industrial relations; it faces problems 
managing workers who are often not satisfied with their wages. Also, operations in SND are 
hampered by occasional electricity supply problems. This may be reflective of views of some 
companies, who face utilities constraints. Indeed, the premium on CS-SIP’s comparably superior 
in-house utilities services may indeed be qualified. Company SND-2 has been directly 
negotiating with the SND authorities to rectify this problem. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
From our logits analysis and case studies, it can be deduced that Singapore’s reputation in 
industrial park management has played a key role in attracting firms to CS-SIP. This non-
corrupt, efficient system is one of the key differentiating factors between CS-SIP and competitor 
parks. Nevertheless, the competitors’ efforts in attempting to match CS-SIP’s infrastructure and 
pro-business environment has diluted much of her other advantages. CS-SIP’s infrastructure still 
retains a critical edge over its competitors, with the sporadic incidents of utilities stoppage in 
SND as a prime example. CS-SIP is currently developing its industrial infrastructure in new 
areas of development and many of the expanding firms are planning to explore initiatives in 
these sectors.  
As illustrated earlier, firms often place political commitment of Chinese authorities as a 
crucial pull factor in investing in CS-SIP. The transfer of majority of ownership rights from the 
Singaporean consortium to the Chinese consortium is deemed as the tipping point in CS-SIP’s 
progress.  This is exemplified by the increase in investments after the transfer.  The shift is in 
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accordance with the theoretical value chain model which reflects the requirement of a stable and 
pro-business governmental support in facilitating mobilization and combination of factors in 
production.  
As well, a readily available labour pool, which was the initial pull factor for many CS-SIP 
and SND tenants, has declined. Firms now cite improvement in labour conditions as an area 
requiring improvement. We attribute this to the crowding out effect apparent in all three parks, 
where the increasing numbers of firms in each park reduces the total amount of labour available 
to each tenant. Such conditions are, however, beyond the control of the Singapore’s planning 
model. Nevertheless, as cited by one of the firms, market forces may eventually compel the 
necessary changes in labour systems. 
To tackle the labour constraint, firms adopt similar pragmatic strategies. Their primary 
strategy is that of training locals, and simultaneously posting executives from abroad, on top of 
providing incentives for training and development. A possible foray for CS-SIP could be the 
establishment of a seed fund to complement the Skills Development Fund for the training of 
labour in CS-SIP. This may be a potential distinguishing pull-factor for future investments. 
Prudent implementation is necessary of such a proposal, because factors such as the local socio-
economic circumstances must be taken into consideration to avoid any backlash. 
To summarize, the practical intent - in the context of the Suzhou ‘experiment’ - was to clone 
the Singapore-styled ‘walled city isolated from the rest of China” (Thomas, 2001). In paradox of 
context, the case-study park encountered greater development challenges when isolated from, 
than when integrated, into the broader host environment. The protracted difficulties are already 
well-documented.  
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Our study, however, contends that the measured experimentation in adapting Singapore’s 
development software, and the transfer of ownership and management to the local partners, have 
re-aligned the stakeholder-interests and engendered an incentive structure for the local partners 
to make the project a success. The upsurge in investment commitments to CS-SIP has 
demonstrated the appeal of the Singapore industrial-township model. The exportability of the 
Singapore model, suitably adapted, is now more apparent and, prima facie, the Suzhou 
‘experiment’ may well provide the model for replication in other regions in China, and other 
emerging markets.  
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Table 1 
 
 Factors Influencing the Respondents’ Decisions to Invest in CS-SIP 
(By Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)ψ, φ 
 
Variables   Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Markets 
 Frequency Rank China Singapore Intermed IndSvc Other Asia Non-Asia 
   (α1) (α2) (α3) (α4) (α7) (α8) 
Political Commitment from China  33 5 -0.859 -2.235 -0.399 -3.360 2.631 0.305 
   
(0.132) (0.059)*** (0.542)  (0.045)** (0.023)** (0.615) 
Investment incentives 43 1 -0.777 -1.272 1.165 -0.367 -0.089 0.332 
   
(0.166) (0.105) (0.079)*** (0.731) (0.904) (0.573) 
Efficient Government 15 10 1.425 0.563 -1.562 -0.168 0.954 0.272 
   
(0.070)*** (0.578) (0.162) (0.895) (0.318) (0.720) 
Competitive Labour 21 8 -1.631 0.612 -0.251 0.147 0.190 -0.140 
   
(0.027)** (0.404) (0.702) (0.893) (0.785) (0.823) 
Conducive Industrial Relations 20 9 -0.161 -0.539 1.214 -0.168 0.184 -0.287 
   
(0.798) (0.552) (0.050)** (0.894) (0.814) (0.651) 
Availability of Skilled Labour 34 4 1.093 -0.803 -0.296 -0.165 0.367 -0.157 
   
(0.049)** (0.360) (0.629) (0.877) (0.614) (0.785) 
Major Buyer 35 3 0.450 0.527 1.002 0.441 0.423 -1.118 
   
(0.420) (0.490) (0.102) (0.667) (0.553) (0.065)*** 
One Stop CSSIP 27 6 0.145 0.087 -0.372 -19.938 -1.378 1.019 
   
(0.797) (0.919) (0.556) (0.999) (0.137) (0.083)*** 
Access to Overseas Market 23 7 -1.562 -0.681 0.227 0.859 -0.436 0.796 
   
(0.020)** (0.389) (0.715) (0.424) (0.544) (0.178) 
Access to Domestic Market 42 2 0.630 0.128 0.797 0.021 0.567 -0.985 
   
(0.253) (0.864) (0.191) (0.984) (0.422) (0.086)*** 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.        
          
φ
 Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.       
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                         
      *** Significant at 10% level 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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Table 2 
 
Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in CS-SIP 
(By Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)ψ, φ 
 
Variables   Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Markets 
 Frequency Rank China Singapore Intermed IndSvc Other Asia Non-Asia 
   (β1) (β2) (β3) (β4) (β7) (β8) 
Shortage of semi-skilled/skilled labour 39 1 0.121 2.296 0.929 2.598 -1.441 -0.273 
   
(0.827) (0.029)** (0.140) (0.068)*** (0.105) (0.642) 
Shortage of professionals & managers 28 4 -1.209 0.006 -0.772 0.590 -1.562 0.291 
   
(0.037)** (0.994) (0.237) (0.588) (0.053)*** (0.621) 
Industrial Related Problems 8 12 2.433 2.180 1.412 -19.662 2.986 -2.641 
   
(0.107) (0.129) (0.152) (0.999) (0.038)** (0.081)*** 
Difficulty in obtaining capital equipment 10 10 1.230 1.035 0.885 2.304 0.010 0.269 
   
(0.191) (0.325) (0.306) (0.054)*** (0.992) (0.757) 
Difficulty in sourcing raw materials 14 8 -2.295 -1.537 0.940 1.237 -2.371 -1.029 
   
(0.008)* (0.219) (0.222) (0.389) (0.075)*** (0.208) 
High and/or rising overhead costs 33 3 0.380 0.918 0.460 -0.430 -0.626 1.326 
   
(0.508) (0.245) (0.449) (0.728) (0.407) (0.022)** 
Impact of government regulations 18 6 0.680 1.692 0.438 -0.604 0.971 -0.558 
   
(0.339) (0.037)** (0.525) (0.627) (0.219) (0.433) 
Competition from overseas competitors 39 1 0.598 1.198 1.324 -0.058 -0.035 0.120 
   
(0.287) (0.136) (0.036)** (0.956) (0.961) (0.834) 
Competition from other Chinese Parks 28 4 -0.141 -0.049 0.526 0.160 -2.443 0.275 
   
(0.798) (0.955) (0.396) (0.904) (0.030)** (0.640) 
Protectionist Barriers Developing 9 11 0.163 2.293 -1.857 -19.174 -1.970 1.609 
   
(0.861) (0.049)** (0.141) (0.999) (0.184) (0.062)*** 
Lack of Familiarity with Location 13 9 -1.427 0.611 0.501 -19.364 -0.817 0.424 
   
(0.098)*** (0.480) (0.469) (0.999) (0.379) (0.532) 
Lack of Transparency  16 7 -1.025 2.142 -0.724 1.501 -1.261 0.420 
   
(0.190) (0.014)** (0.383) (0.244) (0.190) (0.556) 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.        
          
φ
 Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.       
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                         
      *** Significant at 10% level 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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Table 3 
 
Responses to Constraints on Respondents’ Operations in CS-SIP 
 (By Maximum Likelihood Estimates - Binary Logit)ψ, φ 
 
Variables   Type of Ownership Nature of Operations Markets 
 Frequency Rank China Singapore Intermed IndSvc Other Asia Non-Asia 
   (λ1) (λ2) (λ3) (λ4) (λ7) (λ8) 
Post Experienced Executives from 
Singapore 16 4 
-0.549 2.500 -0.201 -0.714 0.481 -0.140 
   
(0.500) (0.003)*** (0.798) (0.603) (0.562) (0.852) 
Encourage Training of Employees 52 1 -0.132 0.512 -0.276 1.055 -0.240 1.240 
   
(0.818) (0.568) (0.662) (0.395) (0.757) (0.059)*** 
Encourage Higher Productivity 30 2 -.361 .413 -.406 -20.848 -.881 -.334 
   
(0.513) (0.610) (0.500) (0.999) (0.270) (0.554) 
Adopt Local Practices 13 5 -1.099 0.211 1.257 -19.075 -1.493 -0.474 
   
(0.154) (0.830) (0.074)** (0.999) (0.199) (0.522) 
Adopt New Technologies 18 3 -0.141 -0.072 1.085 -19.682 -0.587 -0.461 
   
(0.824) (0.939) (0.088)** (0.999) (0.522) (0.484) 
Approach Singapore Agencies 4 6 -19.020 .392 -.316 -19.056 .059 -.871 
   
(0.998) (0.758) (0.795) (0.999) (0.963) (0.481) 
 
Note: ψ Estimated values were taken from the final stepwise regression.        
          
φ
 Values in parentheses are p-values for 2-tailed tests.       
          * Significant at 1% level 
        ** Significant at 5% level                         
      *** Significant at 10% level 
Source: Questionnaire surveys 
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Table 4 
Summary Information of Case Study Firms 
(In the respective Industrial Parks) 
 
Company Ownership Industry Company Employee Strength Primary Markets 
SIP-1* U.K. Electronic 
Components 
More than 500 China, Singapore, USA 
SIP-2* U.S.A. Packaging Less than 100 China, ASEAN 
SIP-3* Japan Molding Less than 50 Singapore, ASEAN 
SND-1ψ,  Switzerland Electronic 
Components 
About 3,500 OECD 
SND-2ψ,  Korea Auto 
Components 
About 150 China 
 
Note:  * Firms located in China-Singapore Suzhou Industrial Park (CS-SIP). 
ψ Firms located in Suzhou National New & Hi-tech Industrial Development Zone (SND). 
 
